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Abstract. User authentication is an important step to protect informa-
tion and in this field face biometrics is advantageous. Face biometrics
is natural, easy to use and less human-invasive. Unfortunately, recent
work has revealed that face biometrics is vulnerable to spoofing attacks
using low-tech cheap equipments. This article presents a countermeasure
against such attacks based on the LBP −TOP operator combining both
space and time information into a single multiresolution texture descrip-
tor. Experiments carried out with the REPLAY ATTACK database show
a Half Total Error Rate (HTER) improvement from 15.16% to 7.60%.
1 Introduction
Despite the progress in the last years, automatic face recognition is still an active
research area. Many tasks, such as recognition under occlusion or recognition in
a crowd and with complex illumination conditions still represent unsolved chal-
lenges. Advances in the area were extensively reported in [8] and [16]. However,
the issue of verifying if the face presented to a camera is indeed a face from a
real person and not an attempt to deceive (spoof) the system has received less
attention.
A spoofing attack consists in the use of forged biometric traits to gain il-
legitimate access to secured resources protected by a biometric authentication
system. The lack of resistance to attacks is not exclusive to face biometrics. [23],
[14] and [18] indicate that fingerprint authentication systems suffer from similar
weakness. [11], [12] and [19] diagnose the same shortcoming on iris recognition
systems. Finally, [5] and [7] address spoofing attacks to speaker biometrics. The
literature review for spoofing in face recognition systems will be presented in
Section 2.
In authentication systems based on face biometrics, spoofing attacks are usu-
ally perpetrated using photographs, videos or forged masks. Moreover, with the
increasing popularity of social networks websites (facebook, flicker, youtube, in-
stagram and others) a great deal of multimedia content is available on the web
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that can be used to spoof a face authentication system. In order to mitigate the
vulnerability of face authentication systems, effective countermeasures against
face spoofing have must be deployed.
In this context, we proposed a novel countermeasure against face spoofing.
Our approach uses an operator called Local Binary Patterns from Three Or-
thogonal Planes (LBP-TOP) that combines space and time information into a
single descriptor with a multiresolution strategy. Experiments conducted using
the REPLAY ATTACK database [6] indicate that our approach has a better
performance in detecting face spoofing attacks using photographs and videos
than state-of-the-art techniques.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly review
the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the application of Local Binary Pat-
terns (LBP ) in space and time domains. Section 4 presents our approach against
facial spoofing attacks. Our experimental set-up and results are discussed in
Section 5. Finally, in Section 6 we summarize this work highlighting its main
contributions.
2 Prior work
Considering the type of countermeasures that do not require user collabora-
tion, Chakka et al. in [4] made a classification considering the following cues in
spoofing attacks:
– Presence of vitality (liveness);
– Differences in motion patterns;
– Differences in image quality assessment.
Presence of vitality or liveness detection consists in the search of features
that only live faces can possess. For example, Pan et al. in [20] develop a coun-
termeasure based on eye-blink.
The countermeasures based on differences in motion patterns rely on the fact
that real faces displays different motion behavior compared to a spoof attempt.
Kollreider et al. [13] present a motion based countermeasure that estimates the
correlation between different regions of the face using optical flow. In that coun-
termeasure, the input is considered a spoof if the optical flow field on the center
of the face and on the center of the ears present the same direction. The perfor-
mance was evaluated using the subset ”Head Rotation Shot” of the XM2VTS
database whose real access was the videos of this subset and the attacks were
generated with hard copies of those data. With this database, that was not
made publicly available, an Equal Error Rate (EER) of 0.5% was achieved. An-
jos et al. [3] present a motion based countermeasure measuring the correlation
between the face and the background through simple frame differences. With
the PRINT ATTACK database, that approach presented a good discrimination
power (HTER equals to 9%).
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Countermeasures based on differences in image quality assessment rely
on the presence of artifacts intrinsically present at the attack media. Such re-
markable properties can be originated from media quality issues or differences
in reflectance properties. Li et al. [15] hypothesize that fraudulent photographs
have less high frequency components than real ones. To test the hypothesis a
small database was built with 4 identities containing both real access and printed
photo attacks. With this private database, an accuracy of 100% was achieved.
Because of differences in reflectance properties, real faces very likely present
different texture patterns compared with fake faces. Following that hypothesis,
Maatta et al. [17] and Chingovska et al. [6] explored the power of Local Binary
Patterns (LBP ) as a countermeasure. Maatta et al. combined 3 different LBP
configurations (LBPu28,2, LBP
u2
16,2 and LBP
u2
8,1) in a normalized face image and
trained a SVM classifier to discriminate real and fake faces. Evaluations carried
out with NUAA Photograph Impostor Database [21] showed a good discrim-
ination power (2.9% in EER). Chingovska et al. analyzed the effectiveness of
LBPu28,1 and set of extended LBPs [22] in still images to discriminate real and fake
faces. Evaluations carried out with three different databases, the NUAA Pho-
tograph Impostor Database, REPLAY ATTACK database and CASIA - Face
Anti-spoofing Database [24] showed a good discrimination power with HTER
equals to 15.16%, 19.03% and 18.17% respectively. Assuming that real access
images concentrate more information in a specific frequency band, Zhang et al.
[24] used, as countermeasure, a set of DoG filters to select a specific frequency
band to discriminate attacks and non attacks. Evaluations carried out with the
CASIA - Face Anti-spoofing Database showed an Equal Error Rate of 17.00%.
3 LBP in space and time domain
Maatta et al. [17] and Chingovska et al. [6] propose LBP based countermea-
sures to spoofing attacks based on the hypothesis that real faces present dif-
ferent texture patterns in comparison with fake ones. However, the proposed
techniques analyze each frame in isolation, not considering the behavior over
time. As pointed out in Section 2, motion is a cue widely used and in combina-
tion with texture can generate a powerful countermeasure.
The first attempt to extend LBP to image sequences, exploring the space
and time information, was introduced with the concept of Volume Local Binary
Patterns (V LBP ) [25]. To capture interframe patterns in textures, V LBP con-
siders the frame sequence as a parallel sequence. Considering a 3× 3 kernel and
thresholding the surroundings of each pixel with the central pixel of the frame
sequence, the result is considered a binary value and its decimal representation
is:
V LBPL,P,R =
3P+1∑
q=0
f(ic − iq)2q, (1)
where L corresponds to the number of predecessors and successors frames, P
is the number of neighbors of ic that corresponds to the gray intensity of the
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evaluated pixel, iq corresponds to the gray intensity of a specific neighbor of ic,
R is the radius of considered neighborhood and f(x) is defined as follows:
f(x) =
{
0 if x < 0
1 if x ≥ 0 . (2)
An histogram of this descriptor, contains 23P+1 elements. Considering P = 8
(the most common configuration [6] [17] [1]) the number of bins in such histogram
will be 33, 554, 432 which is not computationally tractable.
To address this issue, [25] presented a simplification of the V LBP operator;
the so called LBP from Three Orthogonal Planes (LBP − TOP ). Instead of
considering the frame sequence as a three parallel planes, the LBP − TOP
consider three orthogonal planes intersecting the center of a pixel in the XY
direction (normal LBP [1]), XT direction and Y T direction, where T is the time
axis (the frame sequence). Considering three orthogonal planes intersecting each
pixel in a frame sequence, three different histograms are generated and then
concatenated, as it can be seen in Fig. 1. With this approach, the size of the
histogram decreases to 3 ∗ 2P .
Fig. 1. (a) Three planes intersecting one pixel (b) LBP histogram of each plane (c)
Concatenating the histograms (courtesy of [25]).
In the LBP − TOP representation, the radii in each direction (RX , RY
and RT ) and the number of sampling points in each plane (PXY , PXT and
PY T ) can be different as well as the type of LBP operator in each plane. They
can follow the normal, the uniform pattern (u2) or rotation invariant uniform
pattern (riu2) approaches [10], for example. The representation of the LBP −
TOP descriptor is denoted as LBP −TOP operatorPXY ,PXT ,PY T ,RX ,RY ,RT . In addition to
the computational simplification, compared with V LBP , LBP − TOP has the
advantage to generate independent histograms for each of intersecting planes, in
space and time, which can be treated in combination or individually.
Because of the aforementioned complexity issues on the implementation of
a V LBP based processor, the developed countermeasure uses LBP − TOP to
extract spatio-temporal information from video sequences.
LBP − TOP based countermeasure against face spoofing attacks 5
Fig. 2. Block diagram of the proposed countermeasure.
4 The proposed countermeasure
Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of the proposed countermeasure. First, each frame
of the original frame sequence was gray-scaled and passed through a face detector
using MCT features [9]. Only detected faces with more than 50 pixels of width
and height were considered. The detected faces were geometric normalized to
64× 64 pixels. In order to reduce the face detector noise, for each set of frames
used in the LBP − TOP calculation, the same face bounding box was used. As
can be seen in the Fig. 3, the middle frame was chosen. Unfortunately, the face
detector is not error free and in case of error in the middle frame face detection,
the nearest detection was chosen otherwise the observation was discarded.
After face detection step, the LBP operators were calculated for each plane
(XY , XT and Y T ) and the histograms were computed and then concatenated.
To generate a multiresolution description, the histograms in time domain
(XT and Y T ) are concatenated for different values of Rt. The notation chosen
to represent these settings is using brackets for the multiresolution data. For
example, Rt = [1, 3] means that the LBP −TOP operator will be calculated for
Rt = 1, Rt = 2 and Rt = 3 and all resultant histograms will be concatenated.
After the feature extraction step, this data is ready for binary classification to
discriminate spoofing attacks from real accesses.
In order to be comparable with [6], each observation in the original frame
sequence will generate a score independent of the rest of the frame sequence.
Fig. 3. Face detection strategy for Rt = 1.
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The proposed countermeasure was implemented using the free signal-processing
and machine learning toolbox Bob [2] and the source code of the algorithm is
available as an add-on package to this framework1.
5 Experiments
This section describes the performance evaluation of the proposed countermea-
sure on the REPLAY-ATTACK database [6] and using its defined protocol. Such
protocol defines 3 non-overlapped partitions for training, development and test-
ing countermeasures. The training set should be used to train the countermea-
sure, the development set is used to tune the parameters of the countermeasure
and to estimate a threshold value to be used in the test set. The protocol de-
fines the Equal Error Rate (EER) as a decision threshold. Finally, the test set
must be used only to report results. As performance measurement, the protocol
suggests to report the Half Total Error Rate (HTER) on the test data.
5.1 Evaluation methodology
In order to measure the effectiveness of this countermeasure, each parameter
was tuned solely (fixing other elements) using the development set. For this, 5
experiments were carried out evaluating the effectiveness of:
1. Each LBP − TOP plane;
2. Different classifiers;
3. Different LBP operators;
4. Different numbers of sampling points in the LBP − TOP operator
5. Multiresolution approach.
Inspired on [6], the LBP −TOP operator chosen to start the evaluation was
LBP − TOPu28,8,8,1,1,RT .
5.2 Effectiveness of each LBP − TOP plane
Fig. 4 shows the evolution of the test set HTER considering individual and com-
bined histograms of LBP −TOP planes. First, it was analyzed the effectiveness
of each individual plane and then combinations when the multiresolution area
(Rt) is increased. We used, as binary classifier, a linear projection derived from
Linear Discriminant Analysis LDA as is [6].
It can be seen that, by combining the time components (XT and Y T planes)
the results were improved. This suggests that the time information is an impor-
tant cue. The combination of the three planes generated the best results which
suggests that both spatial and time information are important to classify real
and fake faces. For that reason, next results will be presented always with a
combination of the three LBP − TOP planes (XY , XT and Y T ).
1 http://pypi.python.org/pypi/antispoofing.lbptop
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Fig. 4. (Color online) Evaluation of HTER(%) in each plane when the multiresolution
area (Rt) is increased with LBP − TOPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt and LDA classifier - test-set.
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Fig. 5. (Color online) Evaluation of HTER(%) with LBP − TOPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt using dif-
ferent classifiers.
5.3 Effectiveness of different classifiers
Fig. 5 shows the performance of this countermeasure, in HTER terms, with
different classifiers when the multiresolution area (Rt) is increased. The first
classifier applied was the χ2 distance, since the feature vectors are histograms.
For that, the same strategy adopted in [6] was carried out. A reference histogram
only with real accesses was created averaging the histograms in the training set.
Experiments using more complex classifiers were carried out as well. For that,
Linear Discriminant Analysis (LDA) and Support Vector Machines (SVM) with
a radial basis function kernel (RBF) were chosen.
It can be seen that best results were obtained with the non linear SVM using
RBF kernel. It is important to remark that results presented with SVM, should
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Fig. 6. (Color online) (a) Evaluation of HTER(%) with LBP − TOP8,8,8,1,1,Rt using
different LBP configurations in the planes with SVM classifier (b) Evaluation of the
histogram size when (Rt) is increased.
be analyzed carefully for overtraining. The final machine uses ∼ 25000 support
vectors to achieve 7.97%. This number represents ∼ 33% of the training set
size. A simple comparison with the same LBP − TOP configuration with LDA
classifier resulted in an HTER equal to 11.35%. This is not a huge gap and the
classifier is far simpler.
5.4 Effectiveness of different LBP operators
The size of the histogram in a multiresolution analysis, in time domain, increases
linearly with Rt. The choice of an appropriate LBP representation in the planes
is an important issue since this choice impacts the size of the histograms. Using
uniform patterns or rotation invariant extensions, in one or multiple planes, may
bring a significative advantage in computational complexity. Fig. 6 (a) shows the
performance, in HTER terms, configuring each plane as normal LBP (with 256
bins for P = 8), LBPu2 and LBP riu2 when the multiresolution area (Rt) is
increased. Results must be interpreted with the support with the Fig. 6 (b),
which shows the number of bins on the histograms used for classifications in
each configuration.
It can be seen that, when Rt is increased, the HTER saturates in ∼ 11%
and ∼ 8% for LBP riu2 and LBPu2 respectivelly. The normal LBP operator
presents a minimum in 7.60% with Rt = [1, 2] (the best result achieved in this
paper). Results with LBP and LBPu2 presented similar performance and even
the LBP presented the best result, using LBPu2 seems a reasonable tradeoff
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between computational complexity and performance (in HTER terms). Hence
we will still proceed with LBPu2.
5.5 Effectiveness of different numbers of sampling points in the
LBP − TOP operator
Another parameter that impacts in the size of the histograms is the number of
sampling points (P ) in each plane. Fig. 7(a) and (b) show the performance, in
HTER, varying the values of PXT and PY T to 4, 8 and 16 when the multireso-
lution area (Rt) is increased with SVM and LDA classifiers respectively.
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Fig. 7. (Color online) Evaluation of HTER(%) with LBP − TOPu2 using different
values for PXT and PY T in the time planes using (a) SVM classifier (b) LDA classifier.
It can be seen that results with LBP − TOPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt achieved the best
performance (saturating around 8%), using an SVM classifier (see Fig. 7(a)).
However, it was expected good performance using PXT and PY T set to 16 when
the multiresolution analysis (Rt) is increased, since more points were extracted
over the time. Observing the Fig. 7 (b), with LDA as a classifier, the best per-
formance was achieved with PXT and PY T equal to 16. These results suggests
that, when the multiresolution area is increased with PXT and PY T equals to
16, the SVM classifier loses generalization power. In order to track that hypoth-
esis, a simple observation in the number of support vectors can be done. Not
surprisingly, the number of support vectors increases from ∼ 30000 to ∼ 35000
for Rt equals to [1, 2] and [1, 6] respectively. That increase, in the final SVM,
represents ∼ 32% and ∼ 39% of the training set size respectively, re-assign the
overtraining hypothesis. Hence we will still proceed with LBPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt for the
next experiment.
10 Pereira, T.F. Anjos, A. De Martino, J.M. Marcel, S.
5.6 Effectiveness of multiresolution approach
Fig. 8 shows the performance of this countermeaure considering a multiresolu-
tion approach compared with a single resolution approach. The single resolution
approach consists in using only fixed values for Rt, without concatenating his-
tograms for each Rt. With this approach the size of the histograms will be
constant along Rt increase, what decreases the computational complexity.
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Fig. 8. (Color online) Evalutation of HTER% using LBP − TOPu28,8,8,1,1,Rt with and
without histogram concatenation using SVM classifier.
It can be seen that, when the single resolution approach is considered, the
HTER increases with Rt whereas the multiresolution approach helps to keep the
HTER low with the increasing value of Rt. It is possible to suggest that, for
the LBP −TOP descriptor, motion patterns between closest frames carry more
information for spoofing detection than distant ones. Nevertheless, information
from distant frames are important as well and thats help to explain why the best
results were achieved with the multiresolution approach.
5.7 Summary
Table 5.7 summarizes all results obtained compared with the state of art results.
The two first rows are results presented in [6] and the third row was a counter-
measure based on [3] whose source code is freely available for comparison. It can
be seen that the proposed countermeasure presented the best results, overtaking
the state of art results in the REPLAY ATTACK database.
6 Conclusion
This article presented a countermeasure against face spoofing attacks using the
LBP − TOP descriptor combining both space and time information into a sin-
gle descriptor. Experiments carried out with the REPLAY ATTACK database
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Table 1. HTER(%) of classification with different countermeasures
HTER(%)
dev test
LBPu28,1 + SVM [6] 14.84 15.16
(LBPu28,2+LBP
u2
16,2+ LBP
u2
8,1) + SVM [6] 13.90 13.87
Motion coefficient based [3] 11.78 11.79
LBP − TOP riu28,8,8,1,1,[1−6] + SVM 9.78 11.15
LBP − TOPu28,4,4,1,1,[1−6] + SVM 8.49 9.03
LBP − TOPu28,8,8,1,1,[1−4] + SVM 8.49 7.95
LBP − TOP8,8,8,1,1,[1−2] + SVM 7.88 7.60
LBP − TOP8,16,16,1,1,[1−2] + SVM 9.16 8.22
showed that an analysis in time domain improved the results comparing to the
still frame analysis presented in [6] and [17]. A multiresolution analysis in time
domain shows even better results, achieving 7.60% when combined with an SVM
classifier (the best result achieved). It is important to remark that results with
SVM classifier should be taken with care because with the increase of the mul-
tiresolution area, the SVM classifier tends to overtrain on the data. However,
experiments with simpler classifiers, such as LDA, showed that the LBP −TOP
multiresolution approach still demonstrated a great potential against face spoof-
ing in different kind of attacks scenarios, beating the state of art results.
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